Welcome to Cold War Gamer, a blog I am using to record my Cold War wargaming projects. These range from fictitious Cold War hot projects to historical conflicts that took place around the globe throughout the Cold War era, all modelled and gamed in 20mm. The blog includes links to various resources useful to the Cold War Gamer.

My current projects include: Central Front; British & Soviet. South African Border War; Angolans and South Africans. Soviet Afghan War; Soviets and Afghans
Showing posts with label Combined Arms. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Combined Arms. Show all posts

Friday, 10 October 2014

TTP - Soviet Breakthrough Attacks


Whilst there are a lot of references on how the Soviets conducted offensive operations a number of these present quite a confusing view as the different components tend to be presented together.  This post looks specifically at the Breakthrough attack and how it was conducted at the various levels of command.  This enables a range of games and forces for games to be considered that sit within the context of such opperations which makes structuring the opposing forces easier given the lack of historical example.   

The Soviet Army of the Cold War classified the offence into three different types of engagement.
  • The Meeting Engagement
  • The Breakthrough
  • The Pursuit
The meeting engagement and the pursuit were both conceived to deal with fluid situations in the abcence of a formed defence and would be led by the more mobile elements of the force primarily the Tank and BMP equiped Motor Rifle units and formations operating in close cooperation with forward detachments and heliborne forces of the DShV. These operations in the context of the NATO defence plan would initialy be conducted against the covering force and once the main defence had been breached. 



The Breakthrough was the least favoured of the three types of engagement from the Soviet perspective. It would be used when a formed defence was encountered with depth that could not be defeated by manoeuvre. The principal goal of the breakthrough was to create a gap and in their words restore a flank that allowed manoeuvre operations to once again commence.  



FM 100-2-1 has a variable number of armies in a front and the image below shows 5, the model I am using has 2 Combined Arms Armies, 1 Tank Army and 1 Air Army. A Front depending on its posture, size and the composition of its echelons could attack on a frontage of between 150km - 350km.   At 350km this would place all of the fronts Armies in the first echelon this would leave no 2nd Echelon, Reserve or exploitation force although elements to create these capabilities could be withdrawn from the armies.  At 150km this would see two armies in the first echelon leaving one Army to cover the other roles.   The Diagram below shows the variable frontage of the armies dependent on their role in the operation and illustrates how those with a deeper envelopment role would attack on a narrower front and be supported by Air and Aviation to achieve their goals.



The Breakthrough engagement was an operational level activity that would be planned and coordinated by an Army or a Front.  I assume therefore that either a Front or an Army had to be denied the oppourtunity of manoeuvre in order to trigger the action.  This would require a solid defence across a frontage of between 80km - 150 km as a minimum and probably anchored on some fairly difficult terrain.  If the Front were denied freedom of manouver then the Beakthrough opperation would be deemed to be strategic and would gain significantly more support from Front Artillery, Air, Aviation and other assets. If only the Army were denied freedom of movement then the level of support available from Front might reasonably be expected to be much less.



At Army level only one Breakthrough opperation would be conducted at a time this allowed a significant level of Force concentration in terms of Armour, Artillery, Air and Logistic assets.   The most likly force to be considered for such an action would be a combined Arms Army.  This concentration of force created an effective target for nuclear or conventional fire strikes hence its growing unpopularity as a method of conducting buisness.  As an example of the concentration required the Artillery density needed in for a Breakthrough I have seen variously expressed as 60 - 100 tubes per km or 350 tubes for the Breakthrough Division.  Whilst the overall frontage of that division may be 10-15km the attacks would be heavily echeloned and delivered over a much reduced frontage.



The level of concentration would be dependent on the depth and level of preparation of the enemys defence.  So a prepared defence in depth with obstical belts, prepared field and anti tank defences would be met with the more extreme levels of force



The Breakthrough operation doctrinaly would be conducted by a single Division on a 4km frontage attacking with two regiments in the Divisional first echelon each of which would be likely to constitute itself with two battalions in the first echelon and one in the second their would be a variety of options for the regimental and divisional reserves. Unlike the diagram below the first echelon would probably use the BTR regiments.  It is likly that at least one of the Army's other Division's would be engaged in an economy of force action holding the remainder of the Army's front and mounting diversionary attacks.  The armies total frontage could be as little as 45-50km, the Division conducting economy of force and diversionary operations covering over 2/3rds of that.


The level of support from Army in the holding sector would be much less than the Assault sector though sufficient to achieve the aim and deceive the enemy as to the Army Commanders intent. As such it would need to portray the right signature in terms of equipment and activity.  It seems likley that this Division would be reinforced by units from the Army and Front level Anti Tank Regiments in order to help cover its extended frontage but would receive lower allocations of other assets such as Artillery, Engineers and Chemical Troops.



As well as seeking to pin a proportion of the defending force it might also seek to draw the enemy reserve away from the main operation.  What is clear is that the missions and attacking force structures of units in this sector would be very different to those in the Breakthrough sector.  The Army conducting the break through operation would have a much reduced frontage but would be expected to break through to the operational depth of the enemy.



In the model of the Breakthrough I am developing for my scenarios the remaining three divisions would:

  • Form a second Echelon of two MRDs 
  • Form an exploitation force based on a tank division 
  • Form a reserve which might be based on the divisional anti tank Regiment and the independent tank Regiment. 
The precise nature of the echelonment would change to suit enemy and terrain and did not have to be consistent at all levels of command so considerable variety exists here.  Second echelon forces would be fed into the attack to maintain momentum and develop the gap.



Elements from the Second Echelon may well be designated to provide Forward Detachments for the exploitation force and or provide task organised elements to that force which would reduce their available combat power.   Their Divisional Artillery elements would be reduced to reinforce the first echelon as would artillery assets down to divisional level in the Fronts second echelon although these assets together with Divisional Level assets of the 1st echelon would be regrouped to the 2nd echelon as it was committed.  Depending on the nature of the defence and the level at which the operation was being conducted, Front or Army the exploitation force might be provided by either an Army or Front level Operational Manoeuvre Group.



The Operational Manoeuvre Group and its associated Forward Detachments would be held ready to exploit the breakthrough once achieved this would be supported by Army Front and Potentially strategic Air Mobile and Airborne assets ranging in Strength from Bn to Brigade.




Divisional operations would be feasible but toward the end of the period these were more likely to be Brigade level operations using assets from the Airborne divisions.  It seems likely that Attack Helicopter Squadrons, DShV and Airlifted Motor Rifle Companies would initially support the Assault before transitioning to the exploitation force.


As with all Soviet offensive opperations the intent was to engage the enemy simultainiously throughout his operational depth and through out the duration of the attack.  This would mean that the Soviets would simultainiously attack in depth with:
  • Air, 
  • Aviation, 
  • Air Assault, 
  • Long Range Artillery including the Scud Brigades and Frog battalions, 
  • Reconnaissance and Descent forces including Electronic Warfare assets 

Targets for the depth assault might include:
  • Mobile Reserves
  • Reserve Positions
  • Constraints in terrain that reinforcements might have to deploy through
  • Headquaters
  • Nuclear Capable Artillery
  • Artillery concentrations
All that is a lot to fit on a war-games table particularly when you game in 20mm. From the wargaming perspective the Brakethrough attack offers the oppourtunity for a wide variety of games focused on different asspects of the operation.


Games could be linked as part of a campaign offering the opportunity to explore different aspects of the ensuing action. Setting games in such an operational context would allow scenarios to be constructed with coherent force structures and victory conditions. Ideas might include:
  • The initial Assault by a reinforced Assault Battalion supported by elements of the Regiment and its second Echelon.
  • A Break through Attack by heavily reinforced Soviet units with Air and Aviation components opperating in the Soviet and NATO rear targeting reserves 2nd echelon forces headquaters and artillery units.  Whilst NATO air could target Soviet Artillery and follow on forces.  This could be fought across multiple tables with a number of players and would make a a good big game or mini campaign.
  • The committal of the first Echelon Regiments 2nd Echelon battalions in attacks on the subsequent objectives.
  • The commital of the 2nd Echelon through the fractured 1st echelon in order to widen or deepen the breach in the NATO defences. This would place the remnants of the first echelon on table in fire support positions as a reduced strength second echelon that had given assets to the exploitation force as committed through them.  This could be played at any organisational level, Regimental Divisional or Army, the nature and type of the opposing forces would change as the attack would be commencing at varying depths of the defence.
  • The exploitation of the break through.  The comittal of the Forward detachments through the remnents of the Soviet attacking force into the depth of the NATO defence.  This effectively would be the start of the pursuit a subject that will be looked at separately.
  • Counter Attacks by NATO reserve units as the break through progress into the NATO depth.
  • Diversionary Attacks by more lightly configured Soviet Units against entrenched NATO forces with Objective targets that would trigger the committal of NATO reserves rather than the taking and holding of ground.
  • Premptive counter attacks by NATO into the more lightly held Soviet Sectors.
  • Air Assault Raids on NATO depth targets HQs and Nuclear assets.

Some of the concepts expressed in the Big Force on Force Blog around their campaign would seem to provide a useful framework in which to run a series of linked games focusing on tactical action within the overall context of an opperaional scenario where the outcomes of individual games can have an impact on subsequent games.



This would allow the Breakthrough to be looked at in some detail whilst keeping the force levels down to manageable proportions an approach which is a lot more manageable than the big game.  The linked outcomes enables NATO players to achieve effect and be given victory conditions that permit the Soviet attack to progress, victory for NATO might be more than holding the ground and would acknowledge the unbalanced nature of the scenarios created.


There are posts on The fronts in the Western TVD and Fronts against NORTHAG that give a high level view of the disposition of Warsaw pact forces into fronts and looks at the different scenarios for their commitment and the possible plans the Soviets might have used to attack NORTHAG.  The operational context for the attack on CENTAG can be found within the Wissenberg counterattack  scenario description, download and the associated scenario posts.




The advantage of setting the operational context at a level of detail is that creating realistic force compositions for the Soviet force is much easier as they are more dependent on the Army and Front operational goals and allows a more credible representation of a war that never happened.

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Friday, 26 September 2014

Review - Web Resources, The Essentials of Cold War Soviet Doctrine and Organisation for free


As a Change from my normal reviews of books I thought I would cover a number of the many Free ePublication resources available on the internet that can provide a comprehensive view of Soviet Ground forces from the 60s through to the 1980's.  My principal area of interest is in the 1980's as in this decade more than any other the pendulum of advantage see sawed between the major protagonists.

There are numerous web sites covering the subject area the ones I find most useful are nearly all US government sites, for which Historians every where should be eternally great full, these are:
Contained within the archives of this lot are some exceptionally useful documents and books.  The trick here is to try a variety of search terms around a subject to see what comes up.

FM 100-2 Series of Manuals.  


The FM 100-2 series of Manuals can be downloaded from the FAS site along with a large number of other US Army Publications.  They are  Published in 3 sizeable Volumes and cover the US Armys unclassified view of the Soviet Army as follows:
These pretty much cover the ground that Isbey does in Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army although I find him slightly more digestible, to read but less easy on the pocket.





FM 100-2-1 The first publication essentially lays out the doctrine of the Soviet Army with respect to Operations and Tactics.  It covers Offensive operations at the Operational and Tactical level and Defensive Operations including Withdrawal and Relief. It Then goes on to examine the doctrine associated with various supporting activites including:
  • Reconnaissance
  • Fire Support
  • Artillery Support
  • Anti Tank Support 
  • Air Defence
  • Air Support
  • Smoke
  • Engineer Support
  • Electronic Warfare
  • NBC
The book is comprehensive in it's approach and structured in a way that makes it a readily consumable reference. The document is an excellent first port of call on Soviet Doctrine representing the US Armys consolidated and Unclasified view of the Soviet Army, but is to say the least a dry read. Not one I have read cover to Cover, the publication was written during the Cold War and the latest version was published in 1991 so comes with the usual caveats on intelligence based documents.



FM 100-2-2 covers Specialised Warfare and Rear Area Support and is the volume I have used least it deals with operations under special conditions and variously covers:
  • Airborne Operations
  • Heliborn Operations
  • Amphibious Operations
The Heliborn Ops section is particularly weak and if you want to understand the development and deployment of DShV assets you will have to do a lot more reading.  The volume goes on to describe Unconventional Warfare and River Crossings before focusing down on operations in difficult environments, Desert Cold Weather Urban Operations, Night Operations and Rear Area control and Logistics.

This to my mind is the weakest of the three volumes, A useful start point on the understanding that you then need to delve deeper in other resources.



FM100-2-3 is probably my favourite and in truth my nose is rarely out of it. Its an excellent reference on organisation, and a reasonable reference on equipment.
  • Chapters 1-3 cover a general look at structure personnel and training, enough said.
  • Chapter 4 is by far the most useful outlining the organisation of Soviet Forces from Section to Front including some level of detail on the majority of Structures that fit into that space.  There are a few notable exceptions the Army level Flame thrower Battalion is one. The main caveat remains the unclassified nature of the data, equally some of the more esoteric units are covered fairly superficially with reference to only their main equipments.  At Division and below the coverage is comprehensive. 
  • The final chapter number 5 looks at equipment in this it does not cover Ships but deals with most other items. The picture quality tends to be very poor in the PDF versions although the information is reasonably good and is primarily focused on performance, it might be considered a little superficial when compared to something like JANES Armour and Artillery systems particularly versions published post 2000 however it is free.
All up an excellent series of references free to download if your interested in Cold War Soviets you really ought to have a set.

SOVIET Publications


The FM 100-2 series of pamphlets take a US perspective on the Soviet Army and their are a number of PDFs that can round out this view notably:

Tactics the Soviet way is a Soviet publication translated and published by the US Airforce in 1984.  This Copy can be found in the DTIC archive it covers the principals of modern combined arms combat including the Offensive, Meeting Engagements and Defence.  It really talks to the principals governing the different types of operations and is intended as a Guide to the Soviet Officer Corps as such it includes a wide variety of examples to illustrate the points raised.  It, I am afraid, is also a dry read but offers a different perspective to the US written offerings on the subject.  I find it useful when looking at specific operations for Scenarios.

Tactical Reconnaissance, A Soviet View.  This is a very comprehensive guide to a Soviet view of reconnaissance. It covers the full range of assets that may be deployed from Patrols to Communications and Radar reconnaissance before dealing with a variety of recconaisance skills and activities at a level of detail. It is very much a handbook for the Soviet Recconaisance leader discussing different types of patrols and the methods for gaining information.  In line with the Soviet definition of Razvedka it also covers the assembly processing and dissemination of Intelligence.  Some interesting perspectives but quite hard work extracting worthwhile gaming material.

The Rusian Army in the Cold War by Feskov sets out to articulate the ORBAT and the evolution of the ORBAT of the Soviet Army throughout the Cold War it does this in significant detail and is a Russian Language work.  Running sections through a translator can work particularly with the tabulated data where only the titles and the column headers need translating. These can yield a significant level of detail around what units were ware and what units they were comprised of although this can be labour intensive to extract, it will however reveal what regiments and units were part of a particular division at a particular time.  The Table below outlines the composition of regiments and units in Motor Rifle Divisions.



The Voroshilov Academy Lectures , a recent find and covered in its own review the Voroshilov Academy Lectures cover a wealth of detail on Front, Army and Divisional Operations that can provide a lot of context. They are available through an on line archive or as downloadable documents Links can be found from the review post.

Soviet Army Studies Office




Sitting within the DTIC repository is a whole set of work written by the Soviet Army Studies Office this includes the works of such notables as David Glanz and Leicester Grau.  Amongst the articles below are David Glanz,s original paper on The Role of Forward Detachments in Tactical Manoeuvre and J Holcombe's excellent work on Artillery. These Articles will enhance the views provided in the more weighty volumes outlined above.

Artillery
Recce
Defence
Operational Concepts
Force Structure and Organisation


British Publications (updated 02/0418)



I have recently come across a range of British publications on the subject of the Soviet Army a very useful TMP post by Tac Error produced links to most.  The principal document set is the Army Field Manual Volume 2, which was published in 3 Parts.


Part 1 provided an overview, whilst part 2 focused on Front and Army Operations and Part 3 on Divisional Tactics all were published in the early 90s and Part 2 is reviewed in detail here.



In addition the British published in the late 90's  a series of OPFOR guides heavily based Soviet Doctrine and Force structures which both provide a significant volume of useful information:
The Complete set of Genfor Handbooks are available here.










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Wednesday, 17 September 2014

ORBAT - Soviet Late 80's Breakthrough Capability Part 2, Army Independent Flame Thrower Battalion




The Army Independent Flame Thrower Battalion has always been a little difficult to pin down,  FM 100-2-3 identifies it as being part of the organisation for a Soviet Army although it is hard to find evidence for the detail of the units organisation and structure.  Putting this post together has therefore involved a deal of speculation and conjecture to fill in the gaps around the available facts.



Flame Throwers in the Soviet Army have traditionally been employed by chemical troops, who have provided a range of units covering:
  • Flame Throwers
  • Smoke Generation
  • Chemical and Biological detection and decontamination
There are references to the use of flame thrower equipped troops in a number of doctrine publications. Tactics a Soviet view (1984) identifies there use in the chapter on the offensive identifying that they can be used for clearing entrenched enemy in prepared defences. In FM 100-2-2 the section on Urban Operations outlines the organisation for an assault group that would would contain flame weapons as follows:
  • A Motorised Rifle Company
  • One or Two Tank Platoons
  • Anti-Tank Guns
  • An artillery battery in the direct fire role
  • A combat engineer platoon
  • Flamethrower and Chemical Specialists



The same section goes onto look at the task organisation for these units into groups as follows:
  • Attack or Seizure Groups consisting of a motorised rifle platoon reinforced by tanks
  • A Covering and holding group consisting of a motorised rifle platoon reinforced with anti tank guns
  • A fire support group including attached artillery in the direct fire role and Chemical troops with flamethrowers
  • A group of Combat Engineers equipped with bangalore torpedoes and mine clearing devices



The section also articulates some general concepts that are applicable to both Urban operations and more general break through operations against formed defences.  These are that a Division attacks:
  • on a Frontage of 4-6 Kms
  • in two echelons at all levels of command.  
All this demonstrates the doctrine was in place that required flame thrower equiped units to be deployed when faced with either urban operations or the clearance of fortified or heavily defended belts.  Their application in these areas is borne out by use in both the Afghanistan and Chechen conflicts.

Flame Thrower Dismounted Companies

The principal weapon systems deployed by the dismounted flame thrower companies have been the LPO 50 and TPO 50 Flame throwers and the RPO series of thermabaric rocket launchers.

David Isby talks about flame thrower equipped units using LPO-50 and TP0-50 in his section on Engineers.   He notes that these weapons were deployed by Assault Engineers although nearly all other sources clearly attribute the operation of flame throwers to Chemical Troops.



The LPO-50 is conventional Flame Thrower firing a jet of flame 50-70m and contains enough fuel for 6 Bursts.  The TPO-50 was a heavier trolly mounted variant.




The RPO-A or "Sheml"is a recoilless, shoulder launched rocket with a thermabaric warhead that was introduced into service in 1984 and replaced the more traditional LPO-50 back pack flame thrower. David Isby notes a gradual transition with the RPO-A augmenting the LPO-50 in the first instance.  The weapon was used to equip flame thrower platoons and these were deployed in both Afghanistan and Chechnya. Evidence from both conflicts notes that these platoons would be attached to Motor Rifle Battalions as required.  In Chechneya these assets were employed to clear villages as well as cities.  



At one stage it was proposed that the flamethrower platoons would become a permanent feature of the Infantry battalions as they were used so extensively. Whilst this did not happen the proposed organisation of the flame thrower platoon would seem a good model to use for the dismounted element of the Flame Thrower Battalion.  The platoon proposed consisted of two APCs with 14 Gunners and 28 RPO launchers split into two sections one mounted in each vehicle. 




In Afghanistan their is evidence that sections were mounted in BTR series vehicles and in Chechnya BMP2.  The Current Flame thrower battalion has a company mounted in MTLB and a company in BTO.  Other than the BTO which did not enter service until well after the Cold War ended you have a reasonable degree of choice for transport.  At the moment I am torn between BMP2 and MTLB.

The modern Russian Army has at least two flame thrower battalions each is  equipped with 1 Company of TOS-1 and 2 Companies of Assault infantry one in MTLB and one in BTO.  I have read somewhere but cannot currently find the reference, that each Assault company contains only two platoons.  This seems a reasonable structure for the Cold War Battalion.

Flame Thrower Tank Company

Both David Isbey and the current Russian Army include Flame Thrower capable tanks within the Flame Thrower equipped units. David Isbey identifies the TO-55 as being present in Assault Engineer Regiments and goes onto state that a platoon of tanks would directly support motor rifle troops engaged in urban operations and when attacking fortifications or a fortified zone this is in line with the historical evidence from Chechnya.

The TO-55 was a conventional flame thrower tank based on the T-55 that could fire a Jet of Flame unto 200m.  Sufficient fuel was carried by the vehicle for a maximum of 12 bursts.


The other vehicle of interest here is the TOS-1 Buritano.  The TOS-1 is a short range direct fire 220mm Multiple Rocket Launcher based on a T-72 chassis that entered service in the late 80's or early 90's depending on your reference.  Nearly all references agree that it was trialled in Afghanistan prior to the end of that conflict.

The vehicle can fire either a full salvo of 30 rockets or can fire pairs of rockets.  These can engage targets up to a range of 3,500m,  this range has increased with the development of the TOS-1A to around 6,000m, minimum range is stated as 400m.  The Area of coverage quoted is 400m x 200m and I assume this is for a full Salvo so an individual missile approximates to 70m x 35m.



Reports from Chechnya also discuss the deployment of TOS-1 in support of infantry operations and here they identify that 2 vehicles would be used to reinforce the Regimental Artillery Group.  It is worth remembering that the Soviet Army's doctrine on the use of Artillery encourages direct fire engagements so this is not a particularly unusual approach.



Possible Organisation of the Battalion

Based on this evidence you have to ask what organisation would make sense?  
  • A regiment in the Assault would probably only put the Flame units in the first echelon and assaults against fortified zones and Urban areas would be made with 2 echelons at all organisational levels.  A regiment would need to provide support for two of the three battalions at any one time.  This is similar to the doctrine used for the use of  armour in offensive operations.
  • The evidence form Chechnya and Afghanistan notes that a flame thrower platoon supported a battalion.
  • The evidence from Chechnya that 2 TOS-1 would support a Regiment under the control of the RAG suggest that a platoon consisted of 2 TOS-1, I assume the TO-55 was operated in platoons of 3.
  • Janes Armour and Artillery states that only 24 TOS were produced and speculates these would be deployed at front level, although there would seem to be no obvious unit for them to deploy to.  Interestingly 24 vehicles give each army independent flame thrower battalion in GSFG 4 vehicles and this would provide sufficient for a company of two platoons of two vehicles for each. 
  • This begs the question why you would deploy this type of unit to a Tank Army which was doctrinally not likely to be engaged in the sorts of operations where these equipments would be of use this would potentially mean that sufficient capability existed to push TOS-1 wider potentially covering the Northern and Central Groups of Forces. 



A Likely Orbat for the Flame thrower battalion would seem to be:
  • 2 Assault Companies each of 2 Platoons of 2 Sections of 7 Men deploying 14 RPO-A 
  • 1 Tank Company of 2 Platoons
For my Flame Thrower units I am going to assume the Soviet Army would task organise a group of two dismounted Flame Thrower platoons and a Tank Flame Thrower platoon to support a regiment.    The Army Flame thrower battalion proposed would be capable of supporting two regiments and this was sufficient to support a single Divisional breakthrough operation or Urban Assault where the Division would generally be assaulting with two regiments in the first echelon.

Of interest the planning norms for artillery support to such operations in term of the number to tubes required per km also suggest that an Army could support only one breakthrough operation or Urban assault at a time.  Given the way that Artillery in the first echelon is reinforced by the Second it is also feasible that a similar principal might be applied.  

As ever in the Cold War the introduction of Offensive weapons late in the period fell foul of the changing political and economic circumstances that drove the Cold War to its conclusion.  As ever different political circumstances would have lead to different outcomes, particularly if a situation in which conflict would have started could be imagined.  Having said that based on the above the proposed Flame thrower battalion organisation and equipment would seem both reasonable and sufficient given the Soviet Army's doctrine.

Wargames Orbat

The Battalion will be equipped as follows:
  • Pre 1984 - TO-55 Flame tanks and LPO-50 (the LPO-50 organisation would deploy 2 Flame throwers per section and sections would probably be of 8 men)
  • Post 1985 - TO-55 Flame Tanks, with a mix of LPO-50 and RPO-A
  • Post 1989 - TOS-1 and RPO-A for Armies in the forward group of forces.
  • There is evidence to suggest that a purpose built BMP2 was introduced to carry RPO teams, I believe this was a result of operations in Chechnya.  MTLB, BTR or BMP 1 or 2 would seem reasonable.
As I play a Modern adoption of Rapid Fire and use model scale of 1:3, I intend to generate an  Flame thrower Assault support group of:              

  • 1 Tank Company of 1 TOS-1 Buratino or TO-55,
  • 1 Dismounted Company of 2 BMP 2 or 2MTLB  and 4 RPO-A, 1 Officer

Rapid Fire Rules Amendments
         
I suppose the other aspect that needs to be considered is the corresponding effects though I am inclined to keep damage as a flame weapon, perhaps modifying the in building rule, which currently states no casualties but catches fire and has to be abandoned.  Other than that it would seem sensible incorporate the range, area of effect and PHit of the relevant rocket systems.



I do confess that my interest in this capability is not only stimulated by a desire to understand what the Soviets did but also to build and deploy the rather handy looking TOS-1 produced by Modelcollect

References:

ORBAT - 1980's Soviet MRR and TRR, Part 4 Artillery
TTP-Soviet Breakthrough Attacks
ORBAT - Soviet Task Org, Fronts against NORTHAG
ORBAT - Soviet Task Org, Fronts in the Western TVD
Wargames Unit - Soviet Late 80's Flamethrower Company Group

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Friday, 14 March 2014

Review - Book, Rats Tales & Royal Scots in The Gulf



Both these books have a broadly similar approach to telling the story of the first Gulf War from the perspective of two of the Armoured Infantry Battalions the Royal Scots and The Staffords. the First Gulf war followed on from Iraqs invasion of Kuwait, which from Saddam Husseins point of view was one of the most badly timed moves in history, coinciding as it did with the end of the Cold War and releasing one of the largest and most well trained armoured forces of all time to do something else.




So why are these books of interest to the Cold War Gamer? The war they describe in some detail at battle group level was fought by men who were organised, trained and equipped to fight on the Central Front against a Soviet equipped and trained force. Arguably they swapped the plains of Northern Europe for the deserts of Iraq and Kuwait and cracked on. As such the Tactics Techniques and Procedures that fall off the pages in the many interviews that were conducted to bring these books together were those that would have been used in Europe if the Cold War had gone Hot in the late 1980's.

The equipment disparity between the Soviet Army and the Iraqi army was considerable and undoubtedly gave us an easier run. Likewise our ability to concentrate equipment and combat power together with the rapid introduction into service of a number of modifications gave us an arguably more capable force than we could have deployed in Europe. Although some aspects of that are worthy of study in terms of what can be achieved in short order once you know you are going to fight a real war.  As ever it remains difficult to second guess what would have happened given a scenario that would have lead to a war in Europe, periods of heightened tension would have lead to changes. Undisputedly the terrain was different, bizarrely in both the Falklands War and the 1st Gulf War the terrain was not disimilar to our main training areas which were themselves unrepresentative of Northern Europes heavily urbanised and wooded terrain. Ultimately the principals are the same it is the detail of the solution that changes.

Both books have similar value really, giving real examples of Task organisation and Tactical deployment and Manouver that directly translate to the central front. They structures and procedures discussed are those that I recognise both from my time as a platoon commander from 1985-1987 and saw played out at BATUS from 1991-1993.

Structurally the books are not disimilar discussing the pre deployment activities, the in theatre Training and the operations. Both provide some useful detail in the later part of the book with interesting insights coming from both the training and the attacks. Equally there are some interesting pictures in both books. the books themselves are not great literary works and are written with significant inserts from the soldiers themselves which strains the narrative at times.



If you can get a .01p deal on amazon they are undoubtedly exceptional value for money @ £10 you probably need to think a bit and may even only buy one as there value to the gamer is intrinsically similar.





Other Book Reviews:









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