Welcome to Cold War Gamer, a blog I am using to record my Cold War wargaming projects. These range from fictitious Cold War hot projects to historical conflicts that took place around the globe throughout the Cold War era, all modelled and gamed in 20mm. The blog includes links to various resources useful to the Cold War Gamer.

My current projects include: Central Front; British & Soviet. South African Border War; Angolans and South Africans. Soviet Afghan War; Soviets and Afghans
Showing posts with label Soviet. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Soviet. Show all posts

Sunday, 23 September 2018

Review Book - Red Armour an Examination of the Soviet Mobile Force Concept, R Simpkin, 1984





So this was the summer reading, all part of a project called Deep Battle that I have yet to really start writing about or indeed executing but have been researching since about 2015. Over a wet week in Wales I have been ploughing my way through the 12 essays in this book by Brigadier Richard Simpkin who wrote a series of books on military manoeuvre warfare theory in the mid to late 80s and participated in the wide ranging discussion that went on at that time within NATO with regard to managing the Soviet threat.  Of the essays I am interested in I have now read most of them 2-3 times.  The ideas are complex and Simpkin is rarely an easy read.  Working at it in order to understand what he is saying can be very rewarding. 

Red Armour, an examination of the Soviet Mobile Force concepts does pretty much what it says on the tin in that it provides, in its 12 essays, a thought provoking and revealing analysis of Soviet Operational doctrine.  Unlike the Race to the Swift which looks at a variety of maneuver warfare concepts and extrapolates these into the future. This collection of his work focuses on Soviet operational concepts as they had evolved by the height of the Cold War in 1982-83.

The Three parts of the book cover, resources procedures and concepts and each part contains four essays which  discuss at varying levels of detail the following topics:

Part 1 Resources
  • Manpower
  • Philosophy
  • Technology
  • Ground
Part 2 Procedures
  • Control and Support
  • Movement and Deployment
  • Obstacle Crossing
  • Parameters of Tank Force operations
Part 3 Concepts
  • The deep battle
  • The tank force concept
  • Soviet mobile operations
  • The NATO centre
For me the nuggets are in part 2 and 3 which focuses on the procedures and the concepts and illustrates the Soviet thinking by contrasting it to NATOs more positional approaches.


In Part 2 I found the particular essays on; Control and Support, Movement and Deployment and Obstacle Crossing the most useful as they really start to drive at the how at the operational level. examples of points of interest include the Soviet use of Primary routes at high traffic densities whilst holding secondary routes in reserve and clear of significant traffic to enable the flexibility to restructure the order of march accelerating assets and units as needed, this together with the the ability to line switch elements between axis of advance provides the conditions for achieving surprise.  Whilst Simpkin challenges the Soviets ability to achieve the levels of flexibility the approaches could deliver and highlights the tactical risks this exposes them to, I am not clear that he considers these objections in the light of Soviet control approaches which include dedicated movement control organisations deployed along routes at relatively high densities in comparison to Western Armies.

In Part 3 his summary of the deep battle discussion he provides one of the most succinct descriptions of both the theory and the terms that I have come across and his articulation of Soviet Mobile Operations in contrast to the more positional and ground focused doctrines of NATO really start to drive home the key differences between the two.  This starts to highlight what the Soviets focus on in terms of objectives - the enemy rather than the ground, and whilst I have read this in many books the way he contrasts this with the ground focused objectives of NATO doctrines really drives the point home.



His treatment of the principal periods of the Cold War and how the Soviets shifted from the use of Nuclear weapons to provide the conditions for maneuver to the need to exploit strategic surprise in the later period to a similar effect is thought provoking and credibly illustrates the potential impacts that could be achieved even in the absence of Nuclear weapons.  He reasonably challenges the effectiveness of interchangeability of resources in a non nuclear phase although he does not explore the increased scale of indirect fire assets or their increasing effectiveness as the book was written in 1983 and pre dates a number of these changes.

From the Wargames perspective what this all enables is the development of the framework of operational concepts that you need to develop in order to set tactical scenarios in the operational context.  In replicating historical battles in other periods this context is provided by the historical events, in gaming the Cold War, you need an operational and strategic picture to set the action against in order to create realistic scenarios, this is particularly true when dealing with the Soviet Union.  

The driver for this is the subject of Red Armour the Soviet Unions thinking at the operational level. Understanding their focus on the operational rather than the tactical is critical to understanding how they would deal with different situations and the forces that would be brought to bear. In short why NATOs tactical and equipment superiority would be nullified by one of the more sophisticated approaches to maneuver warfare available.  Translating that to table-top games is a challenge all of its own.

I snapped up my copy of Red Armour for £40 about a year ago and at that price I think its a worthwhile addition to the collection if you have an interest in developing table top scenarios in the wider operational context, if you are looking for the detail of what the Soviets did rather than the thinking behind it that can be accessed more cheaply and effectively elsewhere. Current prices on Amazon are running at £200 plus and at that price I would be inclined to leave it on the shelf.





AFM Volume 2, Part 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art, 1991








Monday, 2 April 2018

Review - Book, AFM Volume 2, Part 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art



This was a truly great find by Andy Miles who kindly posted it onto the Red Storm Rising facebook page.  It's not quite the British equivalent to the FM 100 series, it was written in 1991 from the perspective of understanding Soviet Operational Art as the British along with most Western Nations had given this particular subject a stiff ignoring for most of the Cold War. As the author puts it, the Western Nations experience of operations during WW2 was at a different order of Magnitude to the Soviet and points out that whilst the Western allies deployed some 3 Army Groups comprising 91 Divisions on a front of 400 km, in 1944 the Red Army had 10 fronts with 57 Armies and over 560 Divisions and Corps deployed on a frontage of 3200 km.

AFM Volume 2 was produced in 3 parts and whilst this review focuses on Part 2, I will look to pick up on parts 1 and 3 at a later date, for completeness the parts are:
So what's different between this and the FM 100 series, its based on a similar variety of sources including the Vorisilov Lectures, which it contextualises against a late 80s Force structure and is fundamentally focused on the conduct of operations at Army and Front level, and the general Force Composition and task orginisation required to deliver that. I think it does this well focusing on the Soviet Approaches to Offensive and Defensive Operations, it also provides a variety of commentary on effectiveness and some interesting discussion around both drivers for change and the future, which is where it differentiates itself from the FM 100 series.

Equipment and Organisation is considered at a high level and with only sufficient detail to facilitate the main discussion and demonstrate the mapping between doctrine technology and force structures, which frankly the Soviets were masters of.



 It  broadly follows the structure of the Vorisilov Lectures material and includes a deal of informed comment, the main chapters cover:
  • Equipment and Organisation
  • Operational Planning, Context and Concepts
  • Strategic and Operational Marches
  • Offensive Operations
  • Operations in the Enemys Depth
  • Defensive Operations
  • Combat Support
  • Air Operations
  • Amphibious Operations
  • Logistics
  • Command Control and Communications
Annexes include High level org charts and Broad equipment TOEs for Divisions, Armies and Fronts both within and outside of the Western Group of Forces

This is a book that you can either read or dip into, having said that the approach to dipping into it is likly to be go read the whole section on offensive opps and related elements on combat support. The Upside over reading the Vorisilov Lecture material is that the hard work of placing it in the context of the late 80s has been done and this work draws on wider material as well.



The author CJ Dick of the Soviet Studies Research Centre understands his subject well and attempts to explain the Soviet concepts as they stand rather than trying to equate Soviet military thought to  western ideas, an approach taken in a number of the US manuals which generates some very confusing discussions on echelonment and reserves amoungst others. These subjects are covered with far more clarity in this volume.

I particularly like the categorisation of the Cold War period into a number of Eras based on the prevailing doctrine and the discussion around its impact on force structures and organisation. These are articulated as:
  • The Nuclear Era. Doctrine and force structures dominated by the concept of Combat under nuclear conditions
  • The Era of a Conventional Phase. This period was dominated by the impact of two ideas.  The first was driven by the NATO's adoption of flexible response, which would lead to a Conventional Phase at the start of any war and if surprise could be achieved and Soviet Operational art delivered offered the potential of a conventional victory. The other was the vulnerability of tank heavy formations in conventional war demonstrated during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. 
  • The Era of Conventional War. The result of the INF treaty and the failure by both the Warsaw Pact and NATO to upgrade their nuclear capabilities, lead to a belief in the increasing likelihood of an extended conventional phase or the possibility of a wholly conventional war
This is then neatly mapped to the evolution of the organisations and structures that occured over this period.  The rate of change that was feasible for an organisation the size of the Soviet Army also receives some attention. All of this starts to provide a degree of clarity to the variation in content of key sources on the organisations and structures employed within the WGF at different points in time.

Looking at the diagrams and discussion it seems clear that this work fundamentally underpins The Genforce Mobile Force Handbooks written in 1997 as OPFOR guides which provide excellent commentary on what was essentially Soviet organisation and practice but which because they are OPFOR guides I have always had concerns over how they were adapted and how representative they were of what was rather than what was aspired to.



Some of the organisational structures proposed in both this and AFM volume 2 part 3, Soviet Tactics are quite different from what is discussed elsewhere and I have yet to digest what that means and how or whether to reflect it into my current projects. 

As well as this post I have updated the Post on free resources on Soviet Organisation and Doctrine.  All up an excellent find, resource and for free well worth a read. I have a physical copy of the Vorisilov Lectures Operational Art and would love to find a physical copy of this to add to the collection but so far have looked without success. An excellent perspective on Soviet Operational Art

References:

Red Banner The Soviet Military System in Peace and War, C Donnelley, (1988) @ amazon
AFM Volume 2, Part 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art
AFM Volume 2, Part 3, Soviet Tactics
Voroshilov Academy Lectures
Review-Web Resources, The Essentials of Cold War Soviet Doctrine and Organisation for Free
Genforce Handbook, Mobile Force Part 1, Operational Art and Tactical Doctrine, 1997
Genforce Handbook, Mobile Force Part 2, Tables of Organisation and Equipment, 1997







Sunday, 25 March 2018

Review Models - 1/72 S&S Kraz Truck






First post for over a year I think, nothing earth shattering, a review of S&S's Kraz 255.  The 7.5 ton Kraz 214 and 255 trucks provided extreme off-road logistic capacity to the Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces from 1959 through to the end of the Cold War.  The Kraz 214 was produced between 1959 - 1963 and the Kraz 255 entered mass production in 1967 and remained in production until 1994. The Trucks are visually similar, so models in 1/72 can be broadly used to represent either. 




The vehicle provided the platform for a range of variants which included; the TMM vehicle launched bridge from 1974, The carriage and launch vehicle for the PMP ribbon bridge, and the carriage vehicle for the BMK-T bridging boat, together with a number of engineering earth moving and construction variants.  I am using them to provide the transport capability in the Headquaters of my MRR Engineering Company.



The S&S Model is a robust but effective war-games model and is cast in resin and white metal. It can be purchased with or with out the canvas tilt and I have both versions, it cost at the time of posting £11.50 which included P&P.  The models I received were cleanly cast with limited holes and flash.


Other manufactures produce versions of this vehicle notably Armory and Armada but both these manufacturers produce for the modelling fraternity with associated complexity and price.  The model whilst cleverly constructed would provide challenging to convert as the chasis is effectively a component of the truck body so would need to be replaced in order to produce either a TMM or PMP variant. 






After some minimal clean up construction was straight forward and completed quickly with no significant issues, the only thing that slows you down is the amount of time it takes for the super glue to set.  Images of the vehicle show little in the way of stowage so I have left the model in its original state.



I have painted the vehicle in line with my other Soviet equipment in green, although I have been working on evolving my style
  • The Vehicle underside is sprayed in NATO Black XF- 69 before being fixed to the base
  • The vehicle is given an overall coat of Tamiya XF-13 JA Green, and is then oversprayed with NATO Black XF-69 to create an overall dark green colour.
  • The panels were then sprayed with JA Green.
  • The Tilt was painted with Olive Drab XF-62, the areas between the tilt supports were oversprayed wit Nato Black and the ridge was over sprayed with Olive Drab. The whole activity was a bit iterative until the required effect was achieved.
  • The detail was then picked out with a pin wash using Humbrol Black Wash.

  • The wheels were painted with Vallejo Black grey 70852 and then washed with a mix of Vallejo Khaki Grey 70880 and Buff 70976, before being dry brushed with Vallejo Black grey
  • Windows were painted with Vallejo Black Grey
  • The lights front and back were painted with Vallejo Flat Red 70957, Light Orange 70911 and Sky Grey 70989.
  • The doors then received a coat of clear before decals were applied with micro sol then the whole vehicle was sealed with a coat of Tamiya Matt clear.
  • A small amount of chipping was carried out on selected areas of the vehicle using Vallejo Black Grey, Mahogany sand 70846 and Sky Grey
  • The vehicle was then weathered using an overspray of Tamiya XF-59 Desert Yellow.


The truck has been based on laser cut MDF base supplied by East Riding Miniatures,  being a bit of a beast this is 6 cm x 13 cm in order to accommodate the size of the vehicle. These are covered in a mix of sand and white glue before painting.  The base is painted with Citadel Gorthor Brown and dry brushed with Vallejo Desert Yellow 70977.  Once dry a range of basing materials have been used to create the vegetation on the base.






All up a great little model that provides a useful addition to my Cold War Collection and provides a degree of variety in the truck options otherwise available for a Cold War Soviet Army.


References:

Thursday, 6 April 2017

ORBAT - MRR & TRR part 3a, Engineer Company




Soviet Engineer units deployed a range of engineer equipment that provided high levels of automation in support of standard field engineering tasks.  The Regimental Engineer Company included sufficient equipment to replicate the range of engineering support available at higher levels for all engineer tasks less amphibious bridging and river crossing capabilities.  This provided the supported MRR or TRR with significant organic engineer capability in support of the primary mission.  As in all Soviet combat support functions additional resources could be task organised from higher formation for specific missions as required.

I first wrote on the Soviet MRR Engineer Company a few years ago at the time I was focused on the task organised groups that the engineers form to support the regiment and did not spend much time trying to unravel the organisational knot caused by disparities in the organisational structure discussed in FM100-2-3 and Isbey's Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Union.  Since then other sources have come to light and in addition a number of new models have been released allowing for better representation of the unit in 1/72 scale. So I thought it would be worth worth revisiting with more focus on the organisation and equipment of the company. 


Like all supporting arms the engineer assets available to a combined arms commander include:
  • The organic assets associated with the unit or formations
  • Attached assets provided by higher commanders dependent on mission and priority. These can be provided for general support or to achieve specific tasks.
Similar to the allocation of artillery assets the need for centralised or decentralised control depends on the specific operation and phasing:

Centralised control is prefered during
  • Preparation of an offensive
  • Construction of fortifications and minefields 
  • During river crossings operations
Decentralised control is prefered at the start of the offensive or in going over to the defensive. Engineer planning and advice is delivered by the Chief of Engineer Services at each level of command.

The basic goals of Soviet engineer support is to;
  • Create conditions for more effective application of the means of attack, 
  • Support the unhindered movement of friendly forces in the vicinity of the enemy 
  • Affect maneuver on the battlefield 
  • Provide defence for friendly forces from the destructive means of the enemy
and the Engineer tasks that derive from these goals are:
  • Reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain
  • Preparation and maintenance of routes of movement and maneuver
  • Demolitions work and the construction of obstacles
  • Fortification and camouflage of positions and areas
  • Exploration for sources of water and its supply and purification
  • Measures to camouflage troop movements and operations
  • Engineer actions to eliminate the effects of nuclear attacks

Engineers are supported in the delivery of these tasks by Motor Rifle and Tank troops as required.   Not surprisingly with the Soviet army the organisation and structure of the organisation directly maps to the doctrinal tasks and goals it is set to deliver.  At Regimental level that leaves us with an Engineer company as outlined below.


This organisation is derived from a review of a number of sources;
  • FM 100-2-3 provides the main components of the structure 
  • Weapons and tactics of the Soviet Union together with Soviet Combat Engineer Support a research paper by Major J Parr written in 1978 provide the detail of the allocation of equipment to the sections and platoons as well as the view that the technical construction platoon could be replaced by two sapper platoond
  • L Graus paper Instant Russian Obstacles, FMSO, 1996 provided the view that the UMZ was deployed at regimental level. Currently I believe the UMZ was deployed in the early 1980s and I have assumed that organisational change was adopted from introduction into service.
There are a variety of conflicts amoungst the sources around the detail of the equipment holdings and the precise structure. This interpretation adapts the FM 100-2-3 view, a number of other interpretations would be equally valid.



The organisational structure shown allows the company to support the standard Soviet Engineer task groupings through which Engineers in the Soviet army delivered support to the Combined Arms Force. Composition of the main groupings are covered in the post MRR & TRR part 3 Engineers.  In outline the groupings and tasks are as follows:
  • Inzhenernoe Razvedyvatel'nyi Dozor Engineer Reconnaissance Patrol, this may be grouped with other recce units such as Chemical or Regimental or operate independently, they report on the state of roads bridges and obstacles and can work in coordination with or independently of MSDs.


  • Otriad Razvevedki i Razgrazhdeniia Reconnaissance/Obstacle Clearing Detachment, these groupings are used primarily to clear obstacles on route to enemy objectives, I assume these are formed by Combat Troops equipped with Mine ploughs and rollers and potentially supported by Sapper platoons
  • Otryad Oberspecheniya Dvizheniya Movement Support Detachments, facilitate the maneuver of the first echelon in attack, withdrawal and advance. They will normally operate in front of the main body clearing obstacles and improving routes.  They may include security elements from combat or recconnaissance units 
  • Podvizhnyy Otryad Zagrazhedni Mobile Obstacle Detachments, composed primarily of engineer troops they can be reinforced by other units including mine laying aviation assets.  They are configured to rapidly deploy mines, conduct extensive demolitions and deploy and develop obstacles to movement using construction equipment. 
Company HQ & Services




The Company HQ and Services platoon is equipped with 3 Command Vehicles a UAZ 469, BRDM2 and a BTR 60 and a fleet of 8 or 9 trucks for carrying the engineer stores of the regiment, Trucks would either be the 7.5 ton Kraz or the 5 ton Ural and the stores carried were primarily;
  • Mine ploughs, 
  • Mine rollers, 
  • MTU dozer blades
  • Water purification kit. 
  • Stores for Bridging
It is not clear if mine ploughs could be fitted by the tank crews or would need the support of an engineer section.

I have represented the unit with a BRDM 2 and 3 Kraz Trucks. I decided to use the Kraz trucks primarily to differentiate the engineers from the artillery units in my collection.  The Mine rollers and ploughs are represented as separate models which can be attached to any vehicle and the MTU dozer blades I model as permanent attachments to one tank in the tank battalion.

Sapper Platoons


The sapper platoons each consist of 3 sections with each section mounted in a BTR 60 or a truck. Sections are capable of undertaking a variety of tasks including;
  • Demolitions and Cratering
  • Mine clearance 
  • General pioneer work.  
I will be representing the platoon with a single BTR 60 PB and trailer although I am tempted to use BTR 60 Ps to provide some variety.

Sapper & Mine Platoon


The third Sapper platoon in the company was also the minelaying platoon. Again these could be equipped with APCs or trucks although in this instance the APCs would be BTR 152s as the PMR 3 or PMZ 4 could not be operated from a BTR 60PB due to the rear mounting of the engine. As well as minelaying this platoon could also undertake general pioneer work, demolitions and cratering.  I am representing this platoon with 1 BTR 152, 1 PMR3 and a ZIl 131 with a UMZ scatterable mine system as discussed above.



The platoon is equipped with a first line scale of 600 mines, minefields consist of 3 rows and at a 4m spacing this load can deploy an 800m 3 lane minefield in 20 minutes. Reloading takes 10-12 minutes although exchanging the towing vehicles can speed this up.  A large minefield would comprise of a number of 200 - 300m blocks with varying orientation and arranged in depth. Blocks could be interspersed with dummy minefields which would just be ploughed. A platoon of 3 Vehicles can lay fairly significant minefields in an hour and smaller ones in 20 minutes.

Road & Bridging Platoon

The Road and Bridging platoon comprised of three sections that primarily manned specialist engineer equipment appropriate to the sections primary task, the three sections covered
  • Route maintenance and support, 
  • Bridging 
  • Obstacle and fortification construction
The Platoon deploys 11 vehicles in total so I am representing it with 4 models


Road Section



The Road section consists of two vehicles only a DIM mine clearance vehicle and a BAT-M, I am representing it with a single BAT-M.

The BAT-M can be used to develop routes using its forward blade which can be configured in a number of ways depending on the task and the onboard crane.  tasks include:
  • Grading
  • Filling Trenches and Craters
  • Clearing rubble and Snow
  • Breaching Obstacles
Whilst not primarily designed for digging work it could be deployed to develop fortifications and ditches if required, in this it would be less effective than the purpose built machinery described below. The BAT-M started to be replaced by the BAT 2 at the backend of the Cold War
  • BAT-M produced 1953 - 1972
  • BAT 2 Late 80s entered service 1988 onward, no significant change incapability
Bridge Section



The Bridge section varied between tank and Motor Rifle Regiments, Tank Regiments had 3 AVLBs and a 4 TMM truck launched bridging unit. The MRR had only 1 AVLB and the TMM unit.

The AVLBs that could be deployed included:
  • MTU-12. 11m class 50, based on T-54 chassis, production 1955
  • MTU-20, 18m class 50, based on T-55 chassis, production
  • MT-55, 18m class 50, based on a T-55 chassis, deployed in 3 minutes, production 1969 - 1983
  • MTU-72, 18m class 50, based on a T-72 chassis. deployed in 3 minutes, production 1974 - 1992
The TMM bridging sections are 10.5 m in length and together could span a 40m gap over rivers with a depth of up to 1.7m/3m depending on version. The original TMM system was class 50 whilst the later TMM3 was class 60. TMM was originally deployed in 1962 and updated in 1974. A 40m span could be deployed in 90 minutes at night. Multiple TMM sets could be applied to span longer gaps.

Regardless of regiment type I am modelling the bridge section as 1 MT-55 and one TMM.

Fortification Section


The Fortification section could be equipped with a few different vehicles in general there was either an MDK-2  or a BTM. the BTM was primarily a trench digging equipment whilst the MDK - 2 could be used to rapidly develop anti tank ditches vehicle scrapes or bunkers.  The rest of the section comprised 3 PZM trench excavators.

Digging rates were:
  • BTM between 250m - 800m per hour depending on trench depth and soil type. Trenches of 1.1/1.5m depth x 1m width could be produced in straight sections, zig zagging or waves.  
  • MDK-2 creates a trench 3.5m x 3.5m at around 30m an hour.  This seems low compared to the others. 
  • PZM can dig trenches of upto 3.5 m depth x upto 3.5m width at rates between 35m an hour to 200m an hour depending on soil type and trench size
I will be representing the section with a BTM, primarily because I have yet to find an MDK-2 in 1/72, which would be my preference, although scratch building one is looking appealing.


Game Concepts

Usually engineer tasks other than deployment of AVLBs sit outside the scope of most games.  The level of automation deployed by the Soviet Army across all task allow this to be challenged. The obvious candidates are the more rapidly deployed capability options;
  • AVLB launched bridge
  • Single/duel Span TMM
  • Minefield breaching
  • Crater filling
  • Wire Breaching
  • Scatterable minefield deployment
In game completion of tasks;
  • AT Ditch deployment
  • initial trench system creation
  • Surface laid minefields
  • closure of gaps in obstacles
  • initiation of demolitions
Consideration may be given to an opening move of longer duration enabling the placement of obstacles at the commanders discretion or multiple moves of engineering tasks before the arrival of the enemy force or indeed the sequenced arrival of that force over a number of moves all of which would provide scope for in game Engineer play given the rate of production described above and the Soviet doctrine of deployment of obstacles on identified enemy lines of advance.  Most of these concepts would need axis of advance or points of entry to be identified to the Soviet commander an activity that could be randomised.


The understanding of the production rates also play to the development of obstacle belts within scenarios. An understanding of the wider scheme of maneuver and the associated time and space issues allow for calculation of what could be produced in the time available or allow for a degree of pre game play as part of an encounter battle for instance.


The Soviets doctrine called for the deployment of obstacle belts in front of maneuvering forces in order to achieve surprise and chemical troops smoke units would be deployed to screen the tasks from the advancing enemy forces.

Models

You need of course to build models to represent the engineer assets and for engineering capability that includes both the equipment and the terrain items that indicate that the work has taken place.  So creation of engineer units and their employment is a reasonably labour intensive task.

The good news is that over the last couple of years the range of models to support the use of Soviet Engineers in 20mm / 1/72 has increased dramatically and includes figure as well as equipment from such companies as S&S and W Models.

A combination of relatively inexpensive resins and plastic kits will buy you the bulk of the capability with the odd high cost rein from W Models rounding out the capability along with a small amount of scratch building and a little imagination its fairly straight forward to deploy the equipment and figures. A reasonably comprehensive list of models and suppliers for this project is outlined in the table below;


To represent the impact you will of course need a range of terrain pieces including:



  • Deployed equipment bridges
  • Minefields, marked and unmarked
  • Wire obstacles
  • Craters
  • AT Ditches
  • Trenches
  • Trench systems
  • Tank scrapes
Whilst engineering activities are seldom a major focus in miniature wargaming, the Soviet doctrine that called for the rapid development of obstacles in the line of an enemy advance and in support of flank protection and the Anti Tank reserve place a different emphasis on them compared to the less dynamic concepts seen within NATO and makes them worthy of consideration for games.



References:

Web:

BTR 60
Pioneer Battalion 11
Soviet Engineer Digging Equipment
Soviet Combat Engineer Support, US Army Institute for Advanced Soviet and East European Studies
Instant Russian Obstacles, FMSO, 1996
Soviet Engineer Equipment
FM100-2-3

Books:

The Soviet Conduct of Tactical Manoeuvre

Other Posts of Interest:

ORBAT - 1980's Soviet MRR and TRR, Part 3 Engineers
TTP - Soviet Advanced Guard and March Security
Wargames Unit - Soviet MRR, Anti Tank Reserve
Review - Model 1/72, S&S MT-55 Bridgelayer

Sunday, 12 February 2017

ORBAT - Soviet Divisional Units, Part 2 MRD Artillery Regiment


This post looks at Artillery support within the Division and specifically at the composition of the Divisional Artillery Regiment, how the capability changed over the period and how it might be represented within games and scenarios.

The organic components of Divisional Artillery units were  broadly consistent across both the MRD and TD however their detailed composition varied, these Artillery units included:
  • Artillery Commander and his Staff
  • Artillery Regiment
  • Frog Battalion
  • Anti Tank Battalion (not in TD)
  • Artillery Battalions of subordinate MRR/TRR
Whilst in other armies air defence would be a component of the Artillery in the Soviet Ground Forces this was a separate arm of Service.  The Anti Tank Battalion's deployment and grouping have been considered in an earlier post and I'll leave the Frog Battalion for another day.


Equipment and Organisational Change

The composition of the Divisional Artillery Regiment and the amount of organic artillery available to the Division varied significantly over the period from the 1970s through to the end of the 1980s and whilst my focus is on the 1980s it's worth understanding this as it accounts for a variety of conflicting information presented across the various sources which can lead to confusion if the general pattern of transition is not understood.


In the 1970's the MRD's Artillery Regiment comprised two battalions of towed 122mm D30 Howitzers  and 1 battalion of towed 152mm D1/D20 guns, in a TD this was 3 Battalions of towed 122mm D30 guns. Each regiment included 3 Batteries of 6 Guns and most units used trucks as the gun tractors.

By The end of the Cold War units would have an Artillery Regiment equipped with self propelled guns, in MRD's this could include 3 battalions of 2S3, in TD's 2 battalions of 2S3 were more likely.  In both cases batteries were of 8 guns and the regiments included an MLRS Battalion also of 3 batteries of 8 Launchers. The 8 gun and 8 launcher batteries seem to have been largely confined to GSFG.


The MLRS units were incorporated into the divisional Artillery Regiments in the mid 70s and 2S1 and 2S3 started to be introduced to replace the towed guns and howitzers from around 1973.  As individual Regiments transitioned from the D30/1/20 /MLRS mix through the introduction of initially a mix of 2S1 and 2S3 and then to all 2S3 units this created the conditions for a variety of Orbats to exist within the divisions of any particular Army or Front at a given point in time.  The limiting factors on the transition and the principal cause of the variability being the rate of production and the sheer size of the Soviet ground forces, of note 2S3 production did not complete until 1993.



The broad roll out following acceptance in 1971 as outlined by Zaloga was:
  • From 1973 1 2S3 battalion to each MRD Artillery Regiment: A MRD could include 2 D30 battalions and 1 2S3 battalion
  • From 1973 1 2S1Bn to each Cat 1 TD: A TD Could include 12S1 and 2 D30 battalion 
  • From mid 70s 1 122mm D30 battalion was replaced by 2S3 in TDs: TDs could include 1 2S1, 1D30 and 1 2S3 Bn 
  • Cat 1 MRD received 6 battalions of 2S1 two in the Artillery Regiment and 1 in each of the maneuver regiments:  MRD Artillery Regiments could have a composition of 2 2S1 battalions and 1 D1/20 or 2S3 battalion. (this also rather defeats the view of BMP units having 2S1 battalions and BTR units having D30 equipped battalions)
  • Cat 1 TD received 6 battalions of 2S1 taking them to 3 2S1 battalions or 2 2S1 and 1 2S3 battalion. 
  • Additional 2S3 battalions were deployed releasing 2S1 Battalions to the maneuver regiments
  • All this did not happen as a simple sequence and the different policies and deployments interacted with each other unpredictably.

So what does this mean from the Wargames perspective, there were a lot of options, it was a big army, the role out did not complete before the economic impacts at the back end of the Cold war began to hit.  You have a lot of choice, my late period Divisional Artillery Regiment has one 2S1 battalion and two 2S3 battalions. For operations the Soviet Army task organised units into Artillery Groups which introduced a lot more variation and are discussed further below.

The weapons thrown up by these changes were re used, initially they increased the Regimental artillery from a battery to a battalion and as towed assets in these units were replaced with Self propelled platforms then the size of Army and Front Artillery brigades were increased. The quantity of organic Artillery in the division including the regimental Artillery units therefore increased from a likely minimum 78 Guns in the 70's to  a maximum 192 guns by the end of the Cold War.


The broad equipment change time line over the period with respect to Artillery equipment looks like this:
  • 1963 D30
  • 1966 PSNR 1 Ground Surveillance Radar
  • 1971 2S3 entered production
  • 1972 2S1 entered production
  • 1973 first deliveries 2S1/2S3
  • 1974 ACRV IV 12 Series Vehicles
    • IV13 Battery fire direction centre, 
    • IV 14 Battery Command Vehicle with PN44 night sight and D11M-1 Laser range finder,
    • IV15 Battalion Command vehicle with additional radios, 
    • IV16 battalion Fire Direction Centre with Field Artillery computer
  • 1975 SNAR 10 Target detection and fire adjustment
  • 1975 PRP 3 with PN 61 Image Intensifier, D11 Laser Range Finder, IV 520 Fire Control , Computer, dismountable D13 LRF (I think this came later), RL 126 ground surveillance radar
  • 1975 2S3M upgraded loader increased rate of fire
  • 1976 PSNR-5
  • Late 70s DK-1 Dismountable LRF Sage Gloss at Regiment and Division
  • 1980's 9M28 Rocket Grad P (Airburst)
  • 1980 PRP 4 as PRP3 but with PN 71 Thermal Imager a D14 LRF and PSNR -5 ground Surviellance radar
  • 1983 ACRV upgrade
  • 1986 152mm PGM 2K25 Krasnopol complex deployed by 2S3. The 122mm Kitalov 2 complex was a post Cold War system deployed in 2002
  • 1987 2S3M1 Gunsight and data terminal to receive display command information from IV 13
  • 1988 PRP 4M

So not dissimilar to Western developments with the principal areas of change being:
  • The Introduction of Self Propelled Guns.
  • The Introduction of dedicated Command and Observation Post vehicles specifically equipped for role.
  • The development, deployment and improvement of target acquisition systems including radars, lasers, and night observation systems.
  • The development, deployment and improvement conventional munitions to include PGMs and sub munitions.
  • The development and deployment of data systems for processing and passage of command and fire control data.


A wide range of munitions were available for both 122mm and 152 gun systems for the 2S3 these included:
  • OF-540 HE
  • OF-25 HE Frag
  • BP-540 HEAT-FS
  • Br-540B AP-T
  • OF-38 Krasnopol Laser Guided
  • S1 Illuminating
  • ZH3 Smoke
  • and Nuclear Warheads with a 2kt yeild


The impact of all these changes were quite considerable in terms of the effectiveness of Soviet Artillery the impacts included;
  • Increased protection of the gun crews, 
  • More rapid displacement between fire positions, 
  • Reduced time into and out of action, 
  • Improved target acquisition 
  • Increased range, of munitions and target acquisition capability
  • Reduced time to resolve targets at greater ranges
  • Increased speed of transmission of artillery data reducing engagement times and data errors.
  • Increased speed of processing fire missions, through use of fire control computers
  • Improved Lethality, both through munitions developments higher rates of fire and the increase in size of the fire unit from battery to battalion.
These increases in the scale efficiency and overall destructiveness of Soviet Artillery over the period and acted as a significant counter to NATO proliferation of handheld anti tank weapons and enabled the Soviet Army to reduce its doctrinal dependence on nuclear weapon use.

The Divisional Artillery Regiment

The Organisation of the Divisional Artillery Regiment is outlined in the diagrams below, TD's would generally only deploy two battalions of 2S3.  Both Isbey and FM 100-2-3 contain detail on the composition of the various Sub Units.





From a Wargames perspective the main elements that we might want to represent will be rules dependent, from my point of view these are:
  • Command and Control Battery
  • 2S3 Battalions
  • BM 21 Battalion
  • Target Acquisition  Battery
  • Regimental Aid Point
The gun battalions and BM 21 battalions are  broadly similar organisation and include:


For my games I use a vehicle scale of 3:1 so I represent the battalion as 3 batteries with each battery containing:

  • A supply truck, either a Zil 131 or a URAL 4275, 
  • A command vehicle either an IV 12 Series COP/FDC (2 batterys per battalion) or a BTR 60 PU radio vehicle (1 battery per battalion and effectively representing the Battalion HQ). 
  • 2 firing platforms 2S1/2S3 or MLRS depending on the unit type.  
From the battalion I deploy two OPs using the ACRVs as theoretically this organisation could generate seven OPs if required:

  • 4 from the COPs (IV13/15) 
  • 1 from the PRP 
  • 2 additional flanking OPs which would be created on an Ad Hoc basis from battery staff and vehicles.
The Regimental Command and Control Battery


A BTR 60 Command Wagon represents the 3 ACVs admittedly 2 are MTLBus but I have a lot of them in the unit already. Other than that I have added 1 UAZ 469 and 1 Gaz 66.  I also included a PRP 3 which might seem a bit strange.  

One of the things I wanted to resolve within the HQ was the representation of PRP 3. Because of the way the PRPs are distributed with three sitting  in the Regimental Artillery battalions (one each) and three in the divisional Artillery battalions (one each) and one in the Target Acquisition Battery.  You end up with no representation of the vehicle due to the 3:1 vehicle scale, which is a shame as its a good looking wagon. Technically two would be deployed within the division (at 3:1) to accommodate this I added one to the Regimental HQ and one to the Target Acquisition Battery

The Target Acquisition Battery


It's a bit of a challenge to work out what's going on here and with this organisation having components that would sit in the off board force and the onboard force it needs to be divided up.  This is how I viewed it;
  • Recce Platoon @ 2 BTR 60/70/80 + 2 LRF - represented by 1 BTR 60
  • Comms Platoon @ 1 UAZ 452 Compute, 3 UAZ 469, 3 Gaz 66 - 1 UAZ 469, 1 Gaz 66
  • Surveillance Radar Platoon @ 1 SNAR 10, 1 PRP3, 1 Counter Mortar Radar - represented by 1 SNAR 10, 1 PRP 3 (see above for explanation).  The SNAR 10 would normally be deployed along side Artillery COPs.
  • Sound Ranging Platoon @ 4 Gaz Vans, This example of the 1B19 Complex provides a view - 1 Van
  • Topo Survey Platoon - not represented
  • Met Survey Platoon - not Represented
  • Radar Platoon - 3 radar direction finder, 3 Gaz 66 - 1 Gaz 66 and a PSNR -1 or 5
So In Summary 1 BTR 60 ACV, 1 UAZ 469 & Gaz 66, 1 SNAR 10, 1 GAZ VAN, 1 GAZ 66 + Radar.  I have found no source data that attributes the number of vehicles to the platoons within the Target Acquisition Battery so have applied some thought and generated the answer. If anyone knows of better data on this I would be grateful for any pointers as to a more accurate representation. 




Regimental Medical Point



FM 100-3-2 covers the Regimental Medical Point under the MRR and I have assumed its the same for all regiments.  The core of this is a treatment section and one or two collection sections. I assume of the four Ambulances available three are in the collection section and one in the treatment section and the other sections all collocate with the treatment section. I have gone for a three vehicle representation of a Gaz 66 for the Treatment section and 1 UAZ 452 for each collection section.



Krasnopol

Krasnopol was a Precision Guided Munition(PGM) for 152mm Artillery pieces deployed in the late 80s. PGM's effectively allowed artillery firing in the indirect fire role to engage point targets such as vehicles or field defences.  This was achieved through laser target marking and steerable control surfaces on the projectile allowing for in flight course correction.  The amount of correction possible  was limited so the round had to be lobbed into the right space relative to the target and the observer for the whole thing to work. Rounds were provided for all the major 152mm systems in Soviet service. The complex consisted of the OF 39 projectile and a D15 Laser Target Designator together with a couple of command devices one for the gun line and 1 for the OP.


Getting the round in the right place at the right time from the right direction to acquire the illuminated target was critical to success, as was the need to limit the time the target had to react. All this required a degree of thought to be applied to the process, as such engagement zones needed to be recced and engagements planned. This required a degree of preparation of the target zone and the gun line which would improve hit probability and reduce the effectiveness of any target counter measures.  Clearly more Ad Hoc engagement would lead to a lower probability of hit.



Krasnopol was allocated in sets, each set included;
  • 50 Rounds 
  • The shot synchronization system
  • The LTD.  
A battalion might be allocated 4 sets for a total of 200 rounds.  Common practice seemed to allocate one battery as the Krasnopol Battery and one platoon within that battery as the Krasnopol Platoon .  This platoon would carry 140 of the 200 rounds with the remainder being spread across the rest of the battalion. One LTD would go to each Battery COP and 1 to the Battalions mobile reconnaissance post (PRP 3).

In order to engage the OP had to position between the target and the gun line within a 15 degree arc and within 7kms of the target.  Rounds would be fired in succession into the target area either on command of the OP or every 30 seconds.

Krasnopol seems like very useful addition to the indirect fire inventory of the Divisional Artillery Regiment and one which makes the deployment of the related COPs a consideration from both a task organisation perspective and enabling targets to be engaged. I can think of a number of scenarios where It would be interesting to explore the impact of this such as the deployment of the Anti Armour Reserve at divisional or regimental level and the deployment of the Advance Guard.




Artillery Groups and Control of Fires and Units


With the Artillery assets at its disposal the division artillery staff would form a Divisional Artillery Group (DAG) and a number of Regimental Artillery groups (RAG).  The Division would be allocated assets from Army and Front and allocate assets to its subordinate Regiments enhancing the organic capability.

RAGs would generally only be composed for the units in the first echelon. The implication from the Xenophon lessons on Divisional Artillery is that all the divisions artillery assets would be allocated between the DAG and the first echelon RAGs. RAGs for the 2nd echelon units would be composed prior to that echelon being committed effectively being withdrawn from the first. The staff planning data for these add hoc groups were:
  • DAG 4-6 Units
  • RAGs 3-4 Units (For lead Echelons only)
Clearly these would be impacted by the priority of the axis of advance (main or secondary) and the type of operation, advance, breakthrough or pursuit.


Battalions would be allocated fire units from RAG as required this would generally be when acting as an advanced Guard, Forward detachment or for an assault. The composition and distribution of non organic assets has been covered in earlier posts on the MRR and Non Divisional Artillery Units which contain examples of such groupings and provide a view on the range of units from which these elements might be drawn.

In addition reinforcing fire from the Army Artillery Group and the Front Artillery Group could be superimposed by the higher headquarters as it saw fit or as part of a fire plan.

Groupings and hence control of the Artillery units would change with the different phases of the Plan.  In general the DAG would retain control in the preparatory fire phase, then resources and control would shift to the RAGs for the Assault phases before being transferred to the 2nd Echelon as they were committed.  Fire Units Ammunition and Time slots could all be held in reserve.

I aim to explore this further in a TTP post about the deployment and use of divisional artillery after I have digested some more of the data in the Xenophon archive.



Wargames Representation

Whilst the Divisional Artillery Regiment does not easily lend itself to most peoples idea of a 20mm table top action there are a number of ways its assets can be included in games, although I do admit that you have to try hard. There are a number of mechanisms which allow exploration of their use and role, these include;
  • Direct incorporation into the onboard elements as a focus of the scenario an example might be penetration of NATO forces into the depth of the divisional defence where Reserves and Artillery elements might be the core components of the Soviet Force. Such games can be built as stand alone scenarios or be components of a mini campaign.
  • Representation as off board support providing the Divisional wrap of supporting fires and Air Defence, in this instance the elements needing to be represented would be limited to on board Target Acquisition components.   
  • Representation on subsidiary boards enabling aspects of the depth fire battle to play out using Air, Artillery, Air Defence and follow on Maneuver assets as part of a larger game. Personally I like this approach and a variety of additional commands can be generated around the Artillery, Air and Air Defence aspects allowing examination of both deep and rear operations, both of which had significant impact on the outcome of the engagement being fought.  Without additional players the scope is more limited as there is a significant amount of thinking needed and additional game mechanics to play through that would otherwise consume too much time.
  • Linked Games, pre game play and mini campaigns offer approaches to resolving the issues outlined in the subsidiary board approach and if the number of players are limited offer a way to explore elements of Deep and Rear opps.  The detail of the sequencing of the games then becomes the major challenge.
  • Smaller Scale, heresy so not considered further :). Not my particular poison but alternative scales 1:300/600/700 offer the opportunity to develop these aspects in a more manageable space both from a cost and storage perspective, my problem is I am far to in love with the joys of 20mm to go there.



What gets represented and how the support is applied is a key component of designing the scenario and something for the TTP post and some scenario ideas I have been working on.  Both the Big games covered on the blog the Wisenberg Counterattack and Storming the Weidhouse Gap contained significant artillery components. 

Models and Availability

Having identified that you want to build something as challenging as an Artillery Regiment and you have managed to convince your self that it will get the odd outing. Sourcing the models isn't always easy, the table below outlines a range of suppliers for the vehicles required to represent in whole or part the Divisional Artillery Regiment.




Whilst the coverage of the vehicle fleet is fairly complete now with the release of conversion sets by S&S for the BTR series vehicles some of the ground equipments will require scratchbuilding if they are to be represented, notable ones include:
  • Counter Battery Radars
  • D15 Laser Target Designator
  • DK-1 Laser Range Finder (Imagery of this is proving a challenge to find)
where I have already written a review of the relevant models they can be found here:




References:

Books:
Internet:
Other Posts of Interest